Non-State Armed Groups and Technology: The Humanitarian Tragedy at Our Doorstep? by Wallace, Colonel Dave & Reeves, Major Shane
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami National Security & Armed Conflict Law Review
10-1-2013
Non-State Armed Groups and Technology: The
Humanitarian Tragedy at Our Doorstep?
Colonel Dave Wallace
Major Shane Reeves
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umnsac
Part of the Military, War and Peace Commons, and the National Security Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami National
Security & Armed Conflict Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Colonel Dave Wallace and Major Shane Reeves, Non-State Armed Groups and Technology: The Humanitarian Tragedy at Our Doorstep?,
3 U. Miami Nat’l Security & Armed Conflict L. Rev. 26 (2013)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umnsac/vol3/iss1/4




Non-­‐State	  Armed	  Groups	  and	  Technology:	  	  
The	  Humanitarian	  Tragedy	  at	  Our	  Doorstep?	  
	  




	   Technological	  advances	  are	  altering	  the	  contemporary	  asymmetric	  conflicts	  
between	  non-­‐state	   armed	  groups	   and	   state	   actors.	   	   This	   article	   discusses	   the	  
humanitarian	  consequences	  of	  these	  changing	  conflicts	  by	  first	   illustrating	  the	  
dangers	   posed	   by	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   gaining	   access	   to	   advanced	  
technologies.	   	  A	  subsequent	  examination	  of	  the	   increasing	  ability	  of	  non-­‐state	  
armed	  groups	   to	  use	  new	   technologies,	   such	  as	   cyber	  operations,	   to	  mitigate	  
state	  actor	  advantages	  and	   the	   resultant	   risks	   to	   civilian	  populations	   follows.	  
The	   article	   concludes	   that	   the	   humanitarian	   challenges	   presented	   by	   this	  
growing	   intimacy	   between	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   and	   technology,	  whether	  
through	   a	   potentially	   devastating	   attack	   or	   by	   the	   dramatic	   erosion	   to	   the	  
principle	  of	  distinction,	  are	  immense	  and	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  
	  
In	   most	   wars,	   the	   same	   laws	   and	   principles	   hold	   true	   for	   each	   contending	  
side.	   What	   varies	   is	   the	   way	   each	   opponent	   uses	   them,	   according	   to	   his	  
ability,	   his	   particular	   situation,	   and	   his	   relative	   strength.	   Conventional	   war	  
belongs	   to	   this	   general	   case.	   Revolutionary	   war,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  
represents	   an	   exceptional	   case	   not	   only	   because,	   as	   we	   suspect,	   it	   has	   its	  
special	  rules,	  different	  from	  those	  of	  the	  conventional	  war,	  but	  also	  because	  
most	  of	  the	  rules	  applicable	  to	  one	  side	  do	  not	  work	  for	  the	  other.	  In	  a	  fight	  
between	  a	  fly	  and	  a	  lion,	  the	  fly	  cannot	  deliver	  a	  knockout	  blow	  and	  the	  lion	  
cannot	  fly.	  It	  is	  the	  same	  war	  for	  both	  camps	  in	  terms	  of	  space	  and	  time,	  yet	  
there	  are	   two	  distinct	   ‘warfare’s—the	   revolutionary’s	  and,	   shall	  we	   say,	   the	  
counterrevolutionary’s.1	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   The	   paradoxes	   and	   dilemmas	   of	   armed	   conflict	   are	   constant1	   with	   these	  
contradictions	   and	   puzzles	   readily	   apparent	   in	   asymmetrical	   warfare.	  
Asymmetric	   warfare	   is	   defined	   as	   “leveraging	   inferior	   tactical	   or	   operational	  
strength	   against	   the	   vulnerabilities	   of	   a	   superior	   opponent	   to	   achieve	   a	  
disproportionate	   effect	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   undermining	   the	   opponent’s	   will	   in	  
order	   to	   achieve	   the	   asymmetric	   actor’s	   strategic	   objectives.”2	   	   The	  
phenomenon,	  and	  challenge,	  of	  asymmetrical	  warfare	  is	  certainly	  not	  new:	  the	  
earliest	  recorded	  example	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  Old	  Testament	  of	  the	  Bible	  as	  the	  
fight	  between	  David	  and	  Goliath.3	  
	   Non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  practice	  asymmetric	  warfare,	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  as	  
a	   result	   of	   the	   technological	   superiority	   historically	   enjoyed	   by	   state	   actors.4	  
However,	   state	   actors	   increasingly	   do	   not	   have	   a	   monopoly	   on	   advanced	  
technologies	   as	   “globalization	   has	   transformed	   the	   process	   of	   technological	  
innovation	  while	  lowering	  entry	  barriers	  for	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  actors	  to	  acquire	  
                                                
1	  MICHAEL	  L.	  GROSS,	  MORAL	  DILEMMAS	  OF	  MODERN	  WARFARE	  –	  TORTURE,	  ASSASSINATION,	  AND	  BLACKMAIL	  IN	  
THE	  AGE	  OF	  ASYMMETRIC	  CONFLICT	  21	  (Cambridge	  Press,	  2010).	  
2	  Kenneth	  F.	  McKenzie	  Jr.,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Asymmetric	  Threats:	  Priorities	  for	  Defense	  Planning,	  in	  
NAT’L	  DEF.	  UNIV.,	  QDR	  2001	  STRATEGY-­‐DRIVEN	  CHOICES	  FOR	  AMERICA’S	  SECURITY	  75,	  76	  (	  Michele	  A.	  
Flournoy	  ed.,	  2001).	  
3	  K.C.	  Dixit,	  The	  Challenges	  of	  Asymmetric	  Warfare,	  Institute	  for	  Defense	  Studies	  and	  Analysis,	  
IDSA	  Comment,	  (Mar.	  9,	  2010),	  
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheChallengesofAsymmetricWarfare_kcdixit_090310.	  
4	  See,	  e.g.,	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  ARMY,	  FIELD	  MANUAL	  3–24/U.S.	  MARINE	  CORPS	  WARFIGHTING	  PUBLICATION	  3–
33.5,	  COUNTERINSURGENCY	  ix	  (2006)	  [hereinafter	  FM	  3–24]	  (“The	  United	  States	  possesses	  
overwhelming	  conventional	  military	  superiority.	  This	  capability	  has	  pushed	  its	  enemies	  to	  fight	  
U.S.	  forces	  unconventionally,	  mixing	  modern	  technology	  with	  ancient	  techniques	  of	  insurgency	  
and	  terrorism.	  Most	  enemies	  either	  do	  not	  try	  to	  defeat	  the	  United	  States	  with	  conventional	  
operations	  or	  do	  not	  limit	  themselves	  to	  purely	  military	  means.”).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  III	  28	  
advanced	   technologies.”5	   	   As	   a	   result	   “non-­‐state	   actors	   continue	   to	   gain	  
influence	   and	   capabilities	   that,	   during	   the	   past	   century,	   remained	   largely	   the	  
purview	  of	  states.”6	  	  This	  unprecedented	  access	  to	  advanced	  technologies	  most	  
likely	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  alter	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups’	  adherence	  to	  asymmetric	  
warfare,	  but	  it	  does	  provide	  new	  ways	  for	  these	  groups	  to	  leverage	  their	  limited	  
strengths	  “against	   the	  vulnerabilities	  of	   [their]	  superior	  opponent”	   in	  order	   to	  
eventually	  achieve	  their	  strategic	  objectives.7	  
	   Regardless	  of	  potential	  access	  to	  new	  technologies,	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  
are	  cognizant	  that	  state	  actors	  currently	  retain	  a	  technological	  advantage.	  This	  
advantage	   is	  not	   insignificant	  as	  state	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  use	  technology	  to	  tip	  
the	   scales	   heavily	   in	   their	   favor	   in	   contemporary	   military	   operations.8	   	   Non-­‐
state	   armed	   groups	   are	   therefore	   constantly	   searching	   for	   effective	   counter	  
measures	  to	  minimize	  the	  technological	  superiority	  of	  the	  state	  actor.	  Perhaps	  
nothing	   is	   more	   effective	   as	   a	   mitigation	   measure	   than	   a	   non-­‐state	   armed	  
group’s	  willingness	  to	   ignore	  the	  Law	  of	  War’s9	  sacrosanct	  protections	   for	   the	  
civilian	   population	   and	   civilian	   objects10	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   their	   operational	  
                                                
5	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  DEF.,	  QUADRENNIAL	  DEFENSE	  REVIEW	  REPORT	  EXECUTIVE	  SUMMARY	  iv,	  (2010)	  available	  at	  
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf	  [hereinafter	  QDR].	  
6	  Id.	  
7	  McKenzie	  Jr.,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  76.	  In	  asymmetric	  warfare	  the	  ‘weaker’	  actor	  will	  maximize	  the	  
use	  of	  their	  limited	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  negatively	  impact	  the	  psychological	  strength	  of	  the	  
‘stronger’	  actor.	  	  Id.	  	  As	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  acquire	  advanced	  technology,	  they	  will	  most	  
likely	  attempt	  to	  “compensate	  for	  material	  or	  other	  deficiencies”	  by	  using	  previously	  
unattainable	  weaponry	  to	  affect	  the	  morale	  and	  will	  of	  the	  state	  actor.	  Id.	  at	  77.	  
8	  See,	  e.g.,	  Gregory	  Viscusi	  &	  David	  Lerman,	  French	  Air	  Power	  Begins,	  Ends	  NATO	  Campaign	  
Over	  Libya	  With	  Sarkosky’s	  Help,	  BLOOMBERG	  (Oct.	  20,	  2011),	  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-­‐10-­‐20/french-­‐air-­‐power-­‐begins-­‐ends-­‐nato-­‐air-­‐
campaign-­‐over-­‐libya.html	  (describing	  the	  critical	  importance	  of	  NATO	  air	  superiority	  in	  the	  
toppling	  of	  the	  Qaddafi	  regime);	  Mark	  Mazzetti,	  Eric	  Schmitt,	  &	  Robert	  F.	  Worth,	  Two	  Year	  
Manhunt	  Led	  to	  Killing	  of	  Awlaki	  in	  Yemen,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Sept.	  30,	  2011,	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middle	  east/anwar-­‐al-­‐awlaki-­‐is-­‐killed-­‐in-­‐
yemen.html?pagewanted	  =all	  (discussing	  the	  lethal	  capabilities	  of	  the	  U.S.	  drone	  program).	  
9	  See	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  DEF.,	  DIRECTIVE	  2311.01E:	  DOD	  LAW	  OF	  WAR	  PROGRAM,	  ¶	  3.1	  (2006),	  available	  at	  
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf	  (defining	  the	  law	  of	  war	  as	  the	  
part	  of	  international	  law	  that	  regulates	  the	  “conduct	  of	  armed	  hostilities”	  and	  is	  often	  called	  
“the	  law	  of	  armed	  conflict”).	  The	  law	  of	  war,	  the	  law	  of	  armed	  conflict,	  and	  international	  
humanitarian	  law	  are	  interchangeable.	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  article,	  we	  will	  use	  the	  term	  
“law	  of	  war”	  as	  this	  traditional	  term	  clearly	  notates	  the	  lex	  specialis	  that	  governs	  during	  a	  time	  
of	  armed	  conflict.	  
10	  See	  Protocol	  Additional	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  of	  12	  August	  1949,	  and	  Relating	  to	  the	  
Protection	  of	  Victims	  of	  International	  Armed	  Conflict	  (Protocol	  I)	  art.	  48,	  June	  8,	  1977,	  1125	  
U.N.T.S.	  3	  [hereinafter	  AP	  I]	  (“In	  order	  to	  ensure	  respect	  for	  and	  protection	  of	  the	  civilian	  
population	  and	  civilian	  objects,	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  conflict	  shall	  at	  all	  times	  distinguish	  between	  
the	  civilian	  population	  and	  combatants	  and	  between	  civilian	  objects	  and	  military	  objectives	  .	  .	  .	  
.”).	  
2013]	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risks.11	  
	   Exacerbating	  this	  humanitarian	  problem	  is	  the	  growing	  ability	  of	  non-­‐state	  
armed	  groups	   to	  discreetly	  and	  effectively	   conduct	  on-­‐going	  operations	  while	  
living	  amongst	  unsuspecting	  civilian	  populations.	  	  Advanced	  technology,	  and,	  in	  
particular	   the	   rapid	   evolution	   of	   cyberspace,	   allows	   these	   groups	   to	   disperse	  
widely	   across	   the	   globe	  without	   degrading	   their	   capabilities	   or	   agenda.12	   The	  
threat	   to	   longstanding	   international	   norms	   and	   civilian	   populations	   by	   these	  
tactics	   is	   obvious.	   	   Similarly,	   as	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   gain	   access	   to	  
significantly	   advanced	   and	   lethal	   technology,	   they	   will	   not	   hesitate	   to	   target	  
civilian	   populations	   if	   they	   believe	   this	   will	   exploit	   the	   weakness	   of	   their	  
superior	   state	   actor	   foes.13	   	   The	   humanitarian	   consequences	   of	   non-­‐state	  
armed	   groups	   trying	   to	   “level	   the	   playing	   field”	   with	   state	   actors	   by	   either	  
pursuing,	   or	   mitigating,	   advanced	   technology	   are	   therefore	   potentially	  
devastating.	  	  
	   To	   support	   these	   propositions	   this	   article	   will	   first	   illustrate	   the	  
humanitarian	   concerns	   posed	   by	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   gaining	   access	   to	  
advanced	   technologies.	   	   A	   discussion	   of	   the	   erosion	   of	   civilian	   protections	   by	  
non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   in	   an	   asymmetric	   war	   and	   the	   subsequent	  
humanitarian	   risks	   will	   follow.	   	   Finally,	   the	   article	   will	   briefly	   summarize	   the	  
uncertain	   humanitarian	   challenges	   facing	   the	   international	   community	   by	   the	  
arrival	  of	  ever	  increasing	  advanced	  technology.	  
	  
II. HOW	  ARMED	  GROUPS	  USE	  NEW	  TECHNOLOGY	  AND	  WHY	  
	  
	   Asymmetric	   warfare	   encompasses	   a	   wide	   scope	   of	   theory,	   experience,	  
conjecture,	  and	  definition.	  The	  underlying	  premise	  is	  that	  asymmetric	  warfare	  
deals	   with	   unknowns,	   with	   surprise	   in	   terms	   of	   ends,	   ways,	   and	  means.	   	   As	  
Professor	   Michael	   Schmitt	   insightfully	   notes,	   the	   asymmetry	   of	   warfare	   has	  
                                                
11	  See,	  e.g.,	  Human	  Rights	  Council,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Palestine	  and	  Other	  Occupied	  Arab	  
Territories:	  Report	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Fact	  Finding	  Mission	  on	  the	  Gaza	  Conflict,	  ¶¶	  439–98.	  
U.N.	  Doc.	  A/HRC/12/48	  (Sept.	  15,	  2009)	  [hereinafter	  Goldstone	  Report],	  available	  at	  
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/	  
UNFFMGC_Report.pdf	  (detailing	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  Palestinian	  Armed	  Groups	  violated	  
the	  law	  of	  war	  in	  order	  to	  mitigate	  the	  conventional	  superiority	  of	  the	  Israeli	  Armed	  Forces).	  	  	  
12	  See	  Kelly	  Gables,	  Cyber-­‐Apocalypse	  Now:	  Securing	  the	  Internet	  Against	  Cyberterrorism	  and	  
Using	  Universal	  Jurisdiction	  as	  a	  Deterrent,	  43	  VAND.	  J.	  TRANSNAT’L	  L.	  57,	  57	  (2010)	  (“The	  Internet	  
not	  only	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  terrorists	  to	  communicate,	  organize	  terrorist	  cells,	  share	  
information,	  plan	  attacks,	  and	  recruit	  others	  but	  also	  is	  increasingly	  being	  used	  to	  commit	  
cyberterrorist	  acts.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  international	  community	  may	  only	  ignore	  cyberterrorism	  
at	  its	  peril.”).	  
13	  See,	  e.g.,	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  Fatwa	  (Feb.	  23,	  1998),	  available	  at	  
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/jan-­‐june98/fatwa_1998.html	  (“The	  ruling	  to	  
kill	  the	  Americans	  and	  their	  allies—civilians	  and	  military—is	  an	  individual	  duty	  for	  every	  
Muslim	  who	  can	  do	  it	  in	  any	  country	  in	  which	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  do	  it	  .	  .	  .”).	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many	  dimensions.	  That	  is,	  it	  operates	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of	  conflict	  from	  the	  
tactical	   through	   the	   strategic	   levels	   of	  war.	   Asymmetry	   is	   also	  manifested	   in	  
various	   forms:	   technological,	   doctrinal,	   normative,	   participatory	   and	  
legal/moral.	  	  
	   Armed	   groups	   attempt	   to	   “balance	   the	   playing	   field”	   against	   states	   and	  
their	  armed	  forces	  by	  using	   (or	  attempting	  to	  use)	  various	  means	  of	  warfare,	  
including:	  unmanned	  aerial	  vehicles,	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  surface-­‐to-­‐
air	  missiles,	  information	  technology,	  and	  improvised	  explosive	  devices.	  	  	  	  
	  
A. Drone	  Warfare	  
	  
	   Drones	   are	   unmanned	   aerial	   vehicles	   that	   are	   remotely	   controlled	   by	  
“pilots”	  who	  may	  be	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away	  from	  where	  the	  drone	  is	  flying.14	  
In	   the	   air	   domain,	   drones	   are	   used	   to	   engage	   in	   reconnaissance	   and	  
surveillance	   missions,	   to	   facilitate	   communications	   and	   locate	   and	   acquire	  
targets.15	  	  By	  any	  measure,	  drones	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  extraordinarily	  successful	  
in	   finding	   and	   killing	   targeted	   enemies16	   becoming	   a	   prevalent	   aspect	   of	  
airpower.17	   	  Since	  2001,	  drones	  have	   increasingly	  been	   the	  counter-­‐terrorism	  
weapons	  of	  choice.	  	  In	  that	  year,	  the	  U.S.	  Predator	  drone	  fleet	  numbered	  about	  
ten;	  their	  mission	  set	  was	  generally	  limited	  to	  reconnaissance	  missions.18	  	  Since	  
2005,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  1,200	  percent	  increase	  in	  drone	  combat	  air	  patrols	  by	  
the	  United	  States19	  with	  American	   intelligence	  officials	   call	  drones	   their	  most	  
effective	  weapon	  against	  al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  the	  Taliban.20	   	  Hardly	  a	  month	  passes	  
without	   a	   report	   that	   another	   enemy	   leader	   has	   been	   killed	   by	   a	   drone-­‐
launched	  Hellfire	  missile.21	   	  With	  names	   like	  Predator,	  Global	  Hawk,	  Shadow,	  
Raven	  and	  Wasp,	  these	  drones	  are	  an	  indispensable	  part	  of	  the	  U.S.	  efforts	  in	  
Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.22	  
                                                
14	  Mary	  Ellen	  O’Connell,	  The	  Resort	  to	  Drones	  Under	  International	  Law,	  39	  DENV.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  &	  
POL’Y	  585,	  585(2011).	  
15	  WILLIAM	  H.	  BOOTHBY,	  WEAPONS	  AND	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  229	  (2009).	  
16	  Ryan	  J.	  Vogel,	  Drone	  Warfare	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  Armed	  Conflict,	  39	  DENV.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  101,	  
102	  (2011).	  
17	  ROD	  THORNTON,	  ASYMMETRIC	  WARFARE,	  94	  (2010).	  	  
18	  Id.	  at	  104.	  	  
19	  Flight	  of	  the	  Drones,	  ECONOMIST,	  October	  8,	  2011,	  available	  at	  
http://www.economist.com/node/21531433.	  
20	  Predator	  Drones	  and	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicles	  (UAVs),	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  
http://topics.nytimes.com.	  	  
/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html	  (last	  updated	  
July	  30,	  2012).	  
21	  See	  Flight	  of	  the	  Drones,	  supra	  note	  22.	  
22	  See	  generally	  P.W.	  Singer,	  Military	  Robots	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  War,	  NEW	  ATLANTIS,	  Winter	  2009,	  
available	  at	  http://www.thenewatlantis.com/	  publications/military-­‐robots-­‐and-­‐the-­‐laws-­‐of-­‐
war.	  
2013]	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   Drone	  technology	  is	  spreading	  rapidly	  with	  estimates	  of	  up	  to	  50	  countries	  
developing	  or	  purchasing	   these	   systems.23	   	  Countries	   including	   Israel	  and	   the	  
UK	   have	   used	   drones	   for	   combat	   operations	  while	   others	   only	   use	   them	   for	  
surveillance	   purposes.	   	   China,	   for	   example,	   debuted	   a	   small	   drone	   equipped	  
with	  a	  high-­‐definition	  camera	  at	  a	  robotics	  trade	  show.24	  	  Of	  great	  concern	  are	  
the	   growing	   commonality	   of	   drones	   and	   the	   increasing	   ability	   of	   non-­‐state	  
armed	  groups	  to	  acquire	  this	  technology.	  
	   Hezbollah	   reportedly	   deployed	   an	   Iranian-­‐designed	   drone25	   and	   allegedly	  
flew	   at	   least	   three	  Mirsad	   (Arabic	   for	   ‘ambush’)	   drones	   into	   Israel	  with	   each	  
carrying	  a	  payload	  of	  approximately	  twenty-­‐two	  pounds	  of	  explosives,	  packed	  
with	   ball	   bearings.26	   	   A	   Hezbollah	   leader,	   bragging	   at	   a	   rally	   about	   targeting	  
Israel,	   stated	   “[y]ou	   can	   load	   the	  Mirsad	   plane	   with	   a	   quantity	   of	   explosive	  
ranging	  from	  40	  to	  50	  kilos	  and	  send	  it	  to	  its	  target,	  .	  .	  .	  	  do	  you	  want	  a	  power	  
plant,	  water	  plant,	  military	  base?	  Anything!”27	  	  P.W.	  Singer	  notes	  that	  the	  use	  
of	   drones	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   large-­‐scale	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups,	   such	   as	  
Hezbollah,	   and	   that	   more	   obscure	   groups	   are	   increasingly	   able	   to	   use	   or	  
develop	  such	  technology.28	  
	   Contractors,	   such	   as	   the	   group	   previously	   known	   as	   Blackwater,	   added	   a	  
section	   to	   their	   business	   seeking	   to	   rent	   out	   drones.29	   	   Additionally,	   drones	  
have	   a	   number	   of	   commercial	   purposes	   increasing	   their	   proliferation	   around	  
the	   world.	   	   Accordingly,	   non-­‐state	   groups	   have	   greater	   access	   to	   such	  
technology	   and	   their	   ability	   to	  use	   them	   is	   only	   limited	  by	   their	   imagination.	  
For	   example,	   such	   groups	   could,	   in	   a	   cost	   effective	   manner,	   use	   drone	  
technology	   to	  precisely	  attack	  otherwise	  hard	   to	   reach	   targets.	   	   Such	  attacks	  
could	  even	  be	  aimed	  at	   critical	   infrastructure	  or	   the	   civilian	  population	  using	  
weapons	   of	   mass	   destruction.	   	   Put	   differently,	   such	   armed	   groups	   could	  
leverage	  drone	  technology	  to	  do	  far	  more	  damage,	  real	  and	  psychological,	  than	  
                                                
23	  See	  David	  Cortright,	  The	  Scary	  Prospect	  of	  Global	  Drone	  Warfare,	  CNN	  OPINION,	  
http://www.cnn.com/2011/	  	  
10/19/opinion/cortright-­‐drones/index.html	  (last	  updated	  Oct.	  14,	  2011).	  
24	  Brianna	  Lee,	  Things	  You	  Need	  to	  Know	  About	  Drones,	  PBS,	  available	  at	  
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-­‐to-­‐know/five-­‐things/drones/12659.	  
25	  David	  Cortright,	  The	  Scary	  Prospect	  of	  Global	  Drone	  Warfare,	  CNN	  OPINION,	  
http://www.cnn.com/2011	  /10/19/opinion	  /cortright-­‐drones/index.html	  (last	  updated	  Oct.	  14,	  
2011).	  
26	  P.W.	  SINGER,	  WIRED	  FOR	  WAR,	  264	  (2009).	  
27	  NBC	  Nightly	  News:	  Hezbollah	  drone	  threatens	  Israel	  (NBC	  television	  broadcast	  Apr.	  12,	  2005),	  
available	  at	  http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7477528/ns/nightly_news/t/hezbollah-­‐drone-­‐
threatens-­‐israel/.	  
28	  See	  SINGER,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  265.	  	  	  
29	  Id.	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they	  could	  ever	  do	  with	  a	  suicide	  attack	  or	  a	  car	  filled	  with	  explosives.30	  
	  
B. Weapons	  of	  Mass	  Destruction	  
	  
	   Nuclear,	  chemical,	  and	  biological	  weapons	  are	   inherently	  terrorizing31	  and	  
are	  the	  weapons	  state	  actors	  fear	  the	  most	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors.32	  
No	   other	   weapons	   can	   “level	   the	   playing	   field”	   between	   non-­‐state	   armed	  
groups	   and	   state	   actors	   as	   these	   weapons	   of	   mass	   destruction	   have	   the	  
potential	   to	  kill	  millions	  of	  people	  quickly	  with	   relative	  ease.33	   	   In	  one	  of	   the	  
many	  paradoxes	  of	  asymmetrical	  warfare,	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can,	  and	  will,	  likely	  
use	   such	   weapons	   if	   obtained,	   while	   their	   state	   adversaries,	   who	   already	  
possess	  these	  weapons,	  cannot,	  and	  will	  not,	  used	  them.34	  
	   There	  have	  been	  reports	  that	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  continue	  to	  attempt	  
to	   acquire	   such	   weapons.	   For	   example,	   “al-­‐Qaeda’s	   top	   leadership	   has	  
demonstrated	  a	  sustained	  commitment	  to	  buy,	  steal	  or	  construct	  weapons	  of	  
mass	  destruction.”35	   	   In	   late	  2001,	  Ayman	  Zawahiri	   stated,	  “[i]f	  you	  have	  $30	  
million,	   go	   to	   the	   black	   market	   in	   the	   central	   Asia,	   contact	   any	   disgruntled	  
Soviet	  scientist	  and	  a	   lot	  of	  dozens	  of	  smart	  briefcase	  bombs	  are	  available.”36	  
Al-­‐Qaeda	   announced	   its	   goal	   to	   “kill	   four	   million	   Americans”	   a	   few	   months	  
later.37	   	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  reportedly	  paid	  $1.5	  million	   to	  a	  Sudanese	  military	  
officer	  and	  acquired	  a	  uranium	  canister	  in	  1993,	  which	  he	  hoped	  could	  be	  used	  
as	   a	  mass	   destruction	  weapon.38	   	   In	   1998,	   bin	   Laden	  declared	   that	   acquiring	  
and	  using	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  was	  his	  Islamic	  duty	  and	  dispatched	  his	  
senior	  operatives	  to	  attempt	  to	  purchase	  or	  develop	  nuclear	  and	  biochemical	  
weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction.39	  
                                                
30	  Eugene	  Miasnikov,	  Threat	  of	  Terrorism	  Using	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicles:	  Technical	  Aspects,	  in	  
CENTER	  FOR	  ARMS	  CONTROL,	  ENERGY	  AND	  ENVIRONMENTAL	  STUDIES	  MOSCOW	  INSTITUTE	  OF	  PHYSICS	  AND	  
TECHNOLOGY	  4	  (2005),	  http://www.armscontrol.ru/uav/uav-­‐report.pdf.	  
31	  Jessica	  Stern,	  Getting	  and	  Using	  the	  Weapons,	  in	  TERRORISM	  AND	  COUNTERTERRORISM	  182	  (Russel	  
B.	  Howard	  &	  Reid	  Sawyer	  eds.	  2004).	  
32	  See	  THORNTON,	  supra	  note	  20,	  at	  33	  (stating	  that	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  capable	  of	  inflicting	  
massive	  casualties	  and	  generating	  significant	  panic	  with	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction).	  
33	  DAN	  CALDWELL	  &	  ROBERT	  E.	  WILLIAMS,	  JR.,	  SEEKING	  SECURITY	  IN	  AN	  INSECURE	  WORLD	  49	  (2006).	  
34	  THORNTON,	  supra	  note	  20,	  at	  33.	  
35	  Graham	  Allison,	  Foreword	  to	  Rolf	  Mowatt-­‐Larssen,	  Al	  Qaeda	  Weapons	  of	  Mass	  Destruction	  
Threat:	  Hype	  or	  Reality,	  Belfer	  Ctr.	  for	  Sci.	  and	  Int’l	  Affairs,	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  Sch.	  of	  Gov’t	  (Jan.	  
2010),	  http://belfercenter.ksg.	  harvard.edu/files/al-­‐aqaeda-­‐wmd-­‐threat.pdf.	  
36	  Id.	  
37	  Id.	  
38	  See	  ROHAN	  GUNARATNA	  &	  PETER	  CHALK,	  JANE’S	  COUNTER	  TERRORISM	  	  41	  (2002)	  (noting	  that	  al-­‐Qaeda	  
went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  test	  the	  canister	  with	  a	  Geiger	  counter	  to	  ensure	  it	  was	  radioactive).	  
39	  Rolf	  Mowatt-­‐Larssen,	  Al	  Qaeda's	  Pursuit	  of	  Weapons	  of	  Mass	  Destruction,	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  (Jan.	  
25,	  2010)	  available	  at	  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/25/al_qaedas_pursuit_of_weapons_of_mass_	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Non-­‐State	  Armed	  Groups	  and	  Technology	   33	  33	  
	   Non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  besides	  al-­‐Qaeda,	  also	  use,	  or	  covet,	  weapons	  of	  
mass	   destruction.	   	   For	   example,	   LTTE	   rebels	   (the	   Tamil	   Tigers),	   employed	  
chlorine	   gas	   against	   a	   detachment	   of	   the	   Sri	   Lankan	   armed	   forces	   in	   Kiran,	  
Eastern	  Sri	  Lanka	  obtaining	  the	  gas	   from	  a	  nearby	  paper	  mill.40	   	  Recalling	  the	  
attack,	  an	  officer	  said,	  “[e]verything	  was	  dark	  when	  it	  exploded	  [reflecting	  his	  
belief	  that	  the	  chemical	  weapon	  was	  delivered	  by	  mortar-­‐fired	  projectiles],	  but	  
there	   was	   a	   huge	   smoke,	   it	   was	   like	   when	   you	   set	   a	   fire.	   	   The	   ground	   was	  
blackened	   where	   the	   projectiles	   hit.”41	   	   On	   November	   23,	   1995,	   Chechen	  
separatists	   placed	   a	   bomb	   containing	   70	   pounds	   of	   a	  mixture	   of	   cesium-­‐137	  
and	  dynamite	  in	  Moscow’s	  Ismailovsky	  Park.42	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  Chechen	  rebels	  
opted	   not	   to	   explode	   the	   dirty	   bomb	   but	   instead	   informed	   the	  media	   of	   its	  
location.43	  
	   The	  perceived	  threat	  of	  WMD	  use	  by	  non-­‐state	  groups	  has	  been	  increased	  
dramatically	  since	  the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.44	   	  Author	  Andrew	  O’Neill	  offered	  
three	  reasons	  for	  this	  phenomenon.	  First,	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
in	  1991,	  there	  has	  been	  significant	  concern	  about	  the	  physical	  security	  of	  the	  
weapons	   of	  mass	   destruction	   in	   the	   territories	   of	   the	   former	   Soviet	  Union.45	  
The	   second	   reason	   is	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   breed	   of	   non-­‐state	   armed	  
groups	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  use	  lethal	  and	  indiscriminate	  forms	  of	  violence.	  
Finally,	   the	   transnational	   nature	   of	   these	   groups	   makes	   no	   location,	   as	  
illustrated	  by	  the	  attacks	  of	  September	  11th,	  beyond	  their	  reach.46	  
	  
C. Missile	  Technology	  
	  
	   In	   1986,	   the	   United	   States	   armed	   the	   Afghan	   Mujahideen	   with	   Stinger	  
antiaircraft	  missiles	  to	  help	  them	  combat	  the	  Soviet	  Union.47	  	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  
Stinger	   was	   considered	   a	   highly	   effective	   hand-­‐held	   anti-­‐aircraft	   missile	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capable	  of	   locking	  onto	  the	  heat	  signature	  of	  a	  helicopter	  or	  airplane	  engine.	  	  
In	   his	   book,	   Holy	   War,	   Inc.,	   author	   Peter	   L.	   Bergen	   noted	   once	   the	   Stinger	  
missiles	  were	  deployed	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Mujahideen,	  the	  Soviets	  lost	  the	  
air	  superiority	  they	  had	  previously	  enjoyed.	  	  Ahmad	  Shah	  Massoud,	  an	  Afghan	  
military	   leader	   who	   played	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   driving	   the	   Soviet	   army	   out	   of	  
Afghanistan	  once	  quipped,	  “[t]here	  are	  only	  two	  things	  the	  Afghan	  must	  have:	  
the	  Koran	  and	  Singers.”48	  
	   Shoulder-­‐fired	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missiles	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  pose	  
a	   significant	   threat	   to	   passenger	   air	   travel,	   the	   commercial	   aviation	   industry,	  
and	  military	  aircraft	  around	  the	  world.	  Since	  the	  1970s,	  there	  have	  been	  over	  
40	  civilian	  aircraft	  hit	  by	  such	  missiles.49	   	   It	   is	  believed	  that	  two	  dozen	  armed	  
groups	   have	   gained	   access	   to	   surface-­‐to-­‐air	   missiles	   with	   the	   most	   popular	  
remaining	  the	  shoulder-­‐fired	  heating	  missiles.50	  Of	  great	  concern	  today	   is	   the	  
possibility	   of	   a	   state	   collapse	   allowing	   their	   conventional	   arsenal,	   including	  
such	  missiles,	  to	  slip	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups.51	  
	  
D. 	   Improvised	  Explosive	  Devices	  (IEDs)	  
	  
	   Often	  used	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  who	  wage	  non-­‐traditional	  warfare,	  so-­‐called	  
improvised	  explosive	  devises	  or	  IEDs	  can	  be	  made	  from	  almost	  any	  material	  and	  
are	  designed	  to	  kill	  or	  maim.52	  Improvised	  explosive	  devices	  are	  the	  most	  lethal	  
weapons	  of	  non-­‐state	   groups	  participating	   in	   the	   conflicts	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  
Iraq.	   In	   Iraq,	   IEDs	   are	   responsible	   for	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   coalition	   deaths	   while	   in	  
Afghanistan	   such	   attacks	   have	   roughly	   tripled	   in	   the	   past	   two	   years.53	  	  
Improvised	   explosive	   devices	   are	   global	   threats.	   From	   January	   to	   November	  
2011,	   outside	   of	   Iraq	   and	   Afghanistan,	   there	   have	   been	   6,832	   improvised	  
explosive	   events	   in	   111	   countries	   resulting	   in	   12,286	   casualties.	   Such	   attacks	  
were	  carried	  out	  by	  40	  regional	  and	  transnational	  threat	  networks	  of	  non-­‐state	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actors.54	  
	   Because	   of	   the	   on	   going	   and	   increasing	   threat	   by	   IEDs	   in	   Iraq	   and	  
Afghanistan,	   the	  United	   States	   established	   the	   Joint	   IED	   Defeat	   Organization,	  
known	  as	   JIEDDO	   in	  February	  2006.55	   	   In	   JIEDDO’s	  Strategic	  Plan	   (2012-­‐2016),	  
Lieutenant	  General	  Michael	  Barbero	  stated:	  
	  
The	  IED	  is	  the	  weapon	  of	  choice	  for	  the	  overlapping	  consortium	  of	  networks	  
operating	   along	   the	   entire	   threat	   continuum	   —	   criminal,	   insurgent,	   and	  
terrorist	   alike.	   Threat	   networks	   use	   IEDs	   because	   they	   are	   cheap,	   readily	  
available,	  easy	   to	  construct,	   lethal,	  and	  effective.	  The	   IED	   is	  a	  weapon	  used	  
strategically	   to	   cause	   casualties,	   create	   the	   perception	   of	   insecurity,	   and	  
influence	   national	   will.	   This	   threat	   is	   complex	   and	   transnational	   in	   nature,	  
representing	   layers	   of	   interdependent,	   inter-­‐connected	   global	   threat	  
networks,	  and	  support	  systems.56	  
	  
	   A	   basic	   IED	   has	   four	   components:	   	   an	   explosives	   charge,	   an	   initiator,	   a	  
power	  source	  and	  an	  activation	  switch.57	   	  Most	   IEDs	  used	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  
are	  decidedly	   low-­‐tech,	   jury-­‐rigged	  affairs	  consisting	  of	  a	  few	  command	  wires,	  
some	   fertilizer	   chemicals	   and	   wooden	   pressure	   plates.	   	   Others	   consist	   of	  
leftover	   mines	   or	   plastic	   explosives	   that	   are	   detonated	   remotely	   by	   a	  
cellphone.58	   	  However,	  not	  all	   IEDs	  are	  simple;	  non-­‐state	  groups	  are	  becoming	  
increasingly	  sophisticated	   in	   their	  design	  and	  production,	  particularly	   in	   terms	  
of	   explosively	   formed	   projectiles	   and	   advanced	   triggers,	   which	   have	   caused	  
disproportionate	   levels	   of	   casualties	   relative	   to	   the	   numbers	   of	   such	   devices	  
employed.59	  	  An	  example	  from	  the	  conflict	  in	  Iraq	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  With	  the	  
help	   of	   the	   Iranians,	   insurgents	   in	   Iraq	   deployed	   deadly	   devices	   known	   as	  
explosively	  formed	  projectile	  (EFPs).60	  	  This	  type	  of	  IED	  is	  typically	  made	  from	  a	  
pipe	  containing	  explosives	  and	  capped	  by	  a	  copper	  disk.	  When	  detonated,	  the	  
copper	   disk	   is	   transformed	   into	   a	  molten	   jet	   of	  metal	   capable	   of	   penetrating	  
                                                
54	  Spencer	  Ackerman,	  Pentagon:	  Future	  of	  Homemade	  Bombs	  Is	  High-­‐Tech,	  WIRED	  MAGAZINE	  
(Feb.	  14,	  2012,	  2:30	  PM),	  http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/jieddo-­‐high-­‐tech-­‐
bombs/	  (citing	  Counter	  Improvised	  Explosive	  Devise	  Strategic	  Plan,	  JOINT	  IMPROVISED	  EXPLOSIVE	  
DEVICE	  DEFEAT	  ORG.	  2012-­‐2016,	  1–2	  (Jan.	  1,	  2012),	  	  [hereinafter	  JIEDDO],	  available	  at	  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/jieddo-­‐cied-­‐plan-­‐120116.pdf	  (last	  
visited	  Sept.	  30,	  2012).	  	  
55	  See	  generally	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  DEF.,	  DIRECTIVE	  2000.19E,	  JOINT	  IMPROVISED	  EXPLOSIVE	  DEVICE	  DEFEAT	  
ORGANIZATION	  (JIEDDO),	  available	  at	  
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/200019p.pdf.	  
56	  See	  JIEDDO,	  supra	  note	  57,	  at	  iii.	  
57	  See	  GUNARATNA	  &	  CHALK,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  29.	  
58	  See	  JIEDDO,	  supra	  note	  57,	  at	  iii.	  
59	  Id.	  
60	  Tom	  Vanden	  Brook,	  U.S.	  Blames	  Iran	  for	  New	  Bombs	  in	  Iraq,	  USA	  TODAY	  (Jan.	  30,	  2007,	  9:45	  
PM),	  http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-­‐01-­‐30-­‐ied-­‐iran_x.htm.	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armor	  thus	  operating	  the	  same	  as	  a	  U.S.	  anti-­‐tank	  missile.61	  
	   The	   leading	   authorities	   on	   improvised	   explosive	   devices,	   JIEDDO,	   paint	  
an	   alarming	   picture	   of	   the	   advances	   in	   IED	   technology.	   More	   specifically,	   it	  
reports:	  	  	  	   	  
	  
In	  the	  future,	  devices	  will	  adopt	  ever	  more	  sophisticated	  technology,	  limited	  
only	   by	   the	   terrorists’	   imaginations.	   .	   .	   .Future	   bomb	   makers	   will	   seek	   to	  
incorporate	   such	   enhancements	   as	   peroxide-­‐	   and	   hydrogen-­‐based	   explo-­‐
sives;	   nanotechnology	   and	   flexible	   electronics;	   new	   forms	   of	   power,	   e.g.,	  
microbial	   fuel	   cells,	   non-­‐metallic	   and	   solar;	   advanced	   communications	  
(Bluetooth,	  4G,	  Wi-­‐Fi,	  broadband);	  optical	  initiators	  (using	  laser	  or	  telemetry	  
more	  than	  infrared);	  and	  highly	  energetic	  and	  molecular	  materials.	  Indicators	  
have	   shown	   that	   terrorist	   networks	   which	   innovate	   with	   these	   new	  
technologies	  are	  also	  developing	  enhanced	  IED	  concealment	  techniques	  and	  
may	  even	  combine	  IED	  use	  with	  concurrent	  cyber	  attacks.	  Bomb	  makers	  will	  
take	   advantage	   of	   available	   technology	   and	   innovate	   in	   response	   to	  
countermeasures	  —	  weapons	  will	   be	  more	   lethal	   and	  harder	   to	  detect	  and	  
defeat.62	  
	  
E. Information	  Technology	  
	  
	   Information	   technology	   has	   revolutionized	  warfare	   and	   is	   central	   to	   state	  
actor	  military	  dominance.63	  	  Such	  technology	  as	  the	  Global	  Positioning	  System,	  
communications	   capabilities,	   sensors,	   advanced	   radar/sonar,	   cyber	   warfare	  
capabilities,	   guided	   munitions,	   and	   much	   more	   have	   seemingly	   widened	   the	  
capabilities	   gap	   with	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups.	   	   The	   paradox	   of	   a	   conflict	  
between	   a	   state	   actor	   and	   anon-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   is	   that	   such	   modern	  
technology	   is	   both	   the	   great	   separator	   and	   the	   great	   equalizer.64	   	   Non-­‐state	  
groups,	   like	   al-­‐Qaeda,	   Hezbollah,	   Iraqi	   insurgents	   and	   others,	   thrive	   in	   the	  
information	  age	  because	  they	  are	  able	  to	  exploit—or	  threaten	  to—exploit	  many	  
of	   the	   same	   information	   technologies	   that	  make	   state	  militaries	   so	   powerful.	  
Such	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   have	   been	   stunningly	   innovative	   in	   their	  
exploitation	  of	  technology.65	   	  Additionally,	  the	  more	  powerful	  the	  economy	  or	  
military	  organization,	  the	  more	  likely	  they	  will	  rely	  on	  information	  technology,	  
                                                
61	  Id.	  
62	  JIEDDO,	  supra	  note	  57,	  at	  4.	  
63	  See	  Max	  Boot,	  The	  Paradox	  of	  Military	  Technology,	  NEW	  ATLANTIS,	  Fall	  2006,	  available	  at	  
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-­‐paradox-­‐of-­‐military-­‐technology	  (noting	  that	  
the	  United	  States	  has	  the	  most	  advanced	  weapons	  systems	  and	  sophisticated	  information	  
technology	  in	  world;	  however,	  such	  technology	  is	  not	  a	  perfect	  shield	  against	  other	  kinds	  of	  
destructive	  power).	  
64	  Id.	  (According	  to	  Boot,	  technological	  supremacy	  separates	  the	  United	  States	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	  world,	  and	  yet	  modern	  technology	  leaves	  America	  vulnerable	  to	  vicious	  groups	  and	  gangs	  
armed	  with	  AK47s,	  car	  bombs,	  or	  portable	  WMDs).	  
65	  See	  SINGER,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  264.	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which	  results	  in	  a	  greater	  vulnerability.66	  
	   In	  2006,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  an	  armed	  conflict	  with	  Israel	  in	  southern	  Lebanon,	  
Hezbollah	  fighters	  were	  able	  to	  hack	  into	  the	  Israeli	  Army’s	  computer	  and	  radio	  
systems.67	  According	  to	  some	  reports,	  with	  the	  intelligence	  gained	  through	  the	  
intercepts,	   Hezbollah	  was	   able	   to	   thwart	   Israeli	   tank	   assaults.68	   It	   is	   believed	  
that	   Hezbollah	   used	   Iranian-­‐supplied	   technology	   to	   accomplish	   this	   feat.69	  
Commenting	   on	   the	   incident,	   author	   P.W.	   Singer	   stated	   that,	   “[n]otably,	   the	  
group’s	   Internet	   attacks	   on	   Israel	   originally	   appeared	   to	   come	   from	   a	   small	  
south	   Texas	   cable	   company,	   a	   suburban	   Virginia	   cable	   provider	   and	   web-­‐
hosting	  servers	  in	  Delhi,	  Montreal,	  Brooklyn,	  and	  New	  Jersey.	  But	  these	  all	  had	  
actually	  been	  ‘hijacked’	  by	  Hezbollah	  hackers.”70	  
	   Non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   fighting	   against	   coalition	   forces	   in	   Iraq	   and	  
Afghanistan	  have	  also	  used	  information	  technology	  with	  great	  skill.	  Such	  groups	  
post	  videos	  of	  their	  exploits	  on	  the	  Internet	  while	  also	  communicating	  through	  
mobile	   phones,	   e-­‐mails,	   and	  websites.71	   	   The	   Taliban	   is	   even	  using	   Twitter	   to	  
wage	  war	   against	   the	  United	   States.72	   	   In	   Iraq,	   tech	   savvy	   insurgents	   use	   the	  
Internet	   to	   recruit	   suicide	   bombers,	   spread	   propaganda,	   and	   even	   publish	  
monthly	  online	  magazines.73	  
	   Cyberspace	   is	   now	   a	  war	   zone	  where	  many	   of	   the	   decisive	   battles	   of	   the	  
twenty-­‐first	   century	   will	   be	   played	   out.74	   	   The	   United	   States	   Department	   of	  
Defense’s	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review	  Report	  defines	  cyberspace	  as	  “a	  global	  
domain	   within	   the	   information	   environment	   that	   encompasses	   the	  
interdependent	   networks	   of	   information	   technology	   infrastructures,	   including	  
                                                
66	  See	  THORNTON,	  supra	  note	  20,	  at	  55	  (discussing	  the	  challenges	  and	  threats	  of	  asymmetric	  
warfare	  in	  the	  21st	  century).	  
67	  See	  SINGER,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  264.	  
68	  E.g.	  Mohamad	  Bazzi,	  Hezbollah	  Cracked	  the	  Code,	  NEWSDAY	  (Sept.	  17,	  2006,	  8:00	  PM),	  
http://www	  .newsday.com/news/hezbollah-­‐cracked-­‐the-­‐code-­‐1.681121.	  	  	  
69	  See	  John	  Leyden,	  Hezbollah	  Cracks	  Israeli	  Radio	  Code,	  THE	  REGISTER	  (Sept.	  20,	  2006,	  13:06	  
GMT),	  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/09/20/hezbollah_cracks_israeli_radio/.	  
70	  SINGER,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  264.	  
71	  See	  Michelle	  Nichols,	  Tech-­‐savvy	  Taliban	  Fights	  War	  in	  Cyberspace,	  REUTERS	  (July	  20,	  2011,	  
4:13	  AM),	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/20/us-­‐afghanistan-­‐taliban-­‐technology-­‐
idUSTRE76J1HL20110720.	  
72	  Ernesto	  Londoño,	  U.S.	  Military,	  Taliban	  Use	  Twitter	  to	  Wage	  War,	  WASHINGTON	  POST,	  (Dec.	  18,	  
2011),	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-­‐military-­‐taliban-­‐use-­‐twitter-­‐to-­‐
wage-­‐war/2011/12/16/	  gIQAKnJ320_story.html	  (stating	  that	  the	  International	  Security	  
Assistance	  Force	  engages	  in	  a	  “near-­‐daily	  battle”	  with	  the	  Taliban	  on	  Twitter).	  
73	  See	  Jonathan	  Curiel,	  Terror.Com	  /	  Iraq's	  Tech-­‐savvy	  Insurgents	  Are	  Finding	  Supporters	  and	  
Luring	  Suicide-­‐bomber	  Recruits	  over	  the	  Internet,	  SFGATE	  (July	  10,	  2005,	  4:00	  AM),	  
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/	  TERROR-­‐COM-­‐Iraq-­‐s-­‐savy-­‐insurgesnts-­‐are-­‐2623261.php.	  
74	  See	  RICHARD	  A.	  CLARKE,	  CYBER	  WAR,	  69	  (2010).	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the	  Internet	  and	  telecommunication	  networks.”75	  	  Cofer	  Black,	  former	  head	  of	  
the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency's	  Counter	  Terrorism	  Center,	  recently	  noted	  that	  
it	   is	   likely	   that	   we	   will	   see	   more	   cyber	   attacks	   from	   al-­‐Qaeda	   as	   cyber	  
operations	  can	  be	  done	  remotely	  and	  are	  comparatively	  safer	  than	  strapping	  on	  
a	  bomb.76	  	  A	  British	  Home	  Office	  report	  recently	  noted	  that	  “[s]ince	  the	  death	  
of	  Osama	  bin	  Laden,	  al-­‐Qaeda	  has	  explicitly	  called	  not	  only	  for	  acts	  of	   lone	  or	  
individual	  terrorism	  but	  for	  ‘cyber	  jihad.”’77	  
	  
III.	  COUNTERING	  NEW	  TECHNOLOGY	  WITH	  TECHNOLOGY	  
	  
	   The	  aggressive	  pursuit	  of	  new	  technology	  by	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  clearly	  
poses	   long-­‐term	   humanitarian	   risks.	   However,	   of	   greater	   immediate	  
humanitarian	  concern	  are	  the	  evolving	  mitigation	  methods,	  or	  tactics,	  used	  by	  
non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  to	  counter	  the	  technological	  superiority	  of	  state	  actors.	  
Increasingly	   adept	   at	   communicating,	   organizing,	   and	   operating	   from	   any	  
location,	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  are	   less	  and	   less	   tied	  to	  “hot	  battlefields,”78	  
and	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   shield	   their	   operations	   by	   deeply	   embedding	   within	  
unsuspecting	  local	  populations	  across	  the	  world.79	  Additionally,	  technology,	  and	  
                                                
75	  See	  QDR,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  37.	  
76	  ABC	  Nightly	  News:	  Former	  CIA	  Counter-­‐Terror	  Chief:	  Al	  Qaeda	  Will	  Go	  Cyber,	  	  (ABC	  television	  
broadcast	  Aug.	  4,	  2011),	  available	  at	  	  http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cia-­‐counter-­‐terror-­‐chief-­‐al-­‐qaeda-­‐
cyber/story?id=14224256.	  
77	  Duncan	  Gardham,	  Terrorists	  Are	  Harnessing	  Hi-­‐tech	  Communications,	  Government	  Warns,	  
THE	  TELEGRAPH	  (July	  12,	  2011,	  7:18	  PM),	  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-­‐
in-­‐the-­‐uk/8633311/Terrorists-­‐are-­‐harnessing-­‐hi-­‐tech-­‐communications-­‐government-­‐
warns.html.	  
78	  “Hot	  battlefields”	  is	  a	  term	  used	  to	  reference	  geographically	  contained	  conflicts.	  	  For	  
example,	  Afghanistan,	  or	  until	  recently,	  Iraq	  would	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  “hot	  battlefield.”	  	  See,	  
e.g.,	  Ashley	  S.	  Deeks,	  Pakistan’s	  Sovereignty	  and	  The	  Killing	  of	  Osama	  Bin	  Laden,	  AMERICAN	  
SOCIETY	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  INSIGHTS	  (MAY	  5,	  2011),	  http://www.asil.org/insights110505.cfm	  
(“[T]he	  most	  controversial	  aspect	  .	  .	  .	  is	  the	  U.S.	  argument	  that	  this	  conflict	  can	  and	  does	  
extend	  beyond	  the	  “hot	  battlefield”	  of	  Afghanistan	  to	  wherever	  members	  of	  al	  Qaeda	  are	  
found.”);	  Margaret	  Talev,	  U.S.	  to	  Attack	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  Terrorists	  Beyond	  the	  ‘Hot	  Battlefields,’	  
Brennan	  Says,	  BLOOMBERG	  (Sept.	  16,	  2001),	  http://www.bloomberg.com/news	  /2011-­‐	  09-­‐16/u-­‐
s-­‐will-­‐hit-­‐al-­‐qaeda-­‐beyond-­‐hot-­‐battlefields-­‐obama-­‐aide-­‐brennan-­‐says.html	  (discussing	  the	  use	  
of	  military	  force	  against	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  away	  from	  “hot	  battlefields”	  like	  Afghanistan).	  
79	  The	  illegality	  of	  using	  civilians	  as	  a	  “shield”	  is	  without	  question	  in	  international	  armed	  
conflicts.	  See	  AP	  I,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  art.	  51(7)	  (“the	  civilian	  population	  or	  individual	  civilians	  
shall	  not	  be	  used	  to	  render	  certain	  points	  or	  areas	  immune	  from	  military	  operations,	  in	  
particular	  in	  attempts	  to	  shield	  military	  objectives	  from	  attacks	  or	  to	  shield,	  favour	  or	  impede	  
military	  operation.”);	  See	  also	  Geneva	  Convention	  Relative	  to	  the	  Protection	  of	  Civilian	  Persons	  
in	  Time	  of	  War,	  art.	  28,	  Aug.	  12,	  1949,	  6	  U.S.T.	  3516,	  75	  U.N.T.S.	  287	  (“The	  presence	  of	  a	  
protected	  person	  may	  not	  be	  used	  to	  render	  certain	  points	  or	  areas	  immune	  from	  military	  
operations”);	  Rome	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  art	  8(2)(b)(xxiii),	  July	  17,	  1998,	  
37	  I.L.M.	  1002,	  2187	  U.N.T.S.	  90	  (listing	  as	  a	  war	  crime	  “[u]tilizing	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  civilian	  or	  
other	  protected	  person	  to	  render	  certain	  points,	  areas	  or	  military	  forces	  immune	  from	  military	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in	   particular	   cyber	   technology,	   now	   allows	   for	   these	   groups	   to	   conduct	  
asymmetric	   activities	   with	   fewer	   risks	   and	   minimal	   resources	   thus	   further	  
cloaking	   their	   existence.	   Broadly	   dispersed	   and	   quietly	   blended	   into	   various	  
civilian	   population	   centers,	   state	   actor	   advantages	   are	  mitigated	   as	   the	   non-­‐
state	   actor	   is	   virtually	   indistinguishable	   from	   a	   civilian.80	   	   This	   pervasive	  
exploitation	   of	   civilians,	   and	   the	   intentional	   assault	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  
distinction,	   threatens	   the	   delicate	   balance	   between	   military	   necessity	   and	  
humanity	  undercuts	  the	  paramount	  purpose	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  War.81	  
	   In	   general	   terms,	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   cannot	   survive	   direct	   and	  
conventional	   conflicts	   with	   more	   technologically	   superior	   state	   opponents.82	  	  
To	   compete,	   these	   groups	   consciously	   “avoid	   mirroring	   Western	   military	  
organizations	   and	   approaches	   to	   war”83	   and	   “by	   operating	   well	   outside	   the	  
moral	   framework	   of	   the	   traditional	   Western	   approach”	   to	   hostilities.84	  	  
Unconstrained	   by	   these	   assumed	   “universal	   norms	   of	   behaviour”85	   non-­‐state	  
armed	   groups	   can	   seek	   advantages	   by	   practicing	   unorthodox,	   or	   even	   legally	  
prohibited,	  approaches	  to	  warfare.	  	  The	  Law	  of	  War	  mandate	  requiring	  parties	  
to	   a	   conflict	   to	   distinguish	   between	   civilians	   and	   conflict	   participants86	   is	  
                                                                                                                             
operations.”).	  Though	  not	  as	  clearly	  articulated,	  the	  prohibition	  on	  misusing	  civilians	  also	  exists	  
in	  non-­‐international	  armed	  conflicts.	  	  See	  Protocol	  Additional	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  of	  
August	  1949,	  and	  Relating	  to	  the	  Protection	  of	  Victims	  of	  Non-­‐International	  Armed	  Conflict	  
(Protocol	  II)	  art.	  13,	  June	  8,	  1977,	  1125	  U.N.T.S.	  609	  [hereinafter	  AP	  II]	  (discussing	  general	  
protections	  for	  civilians	  in	  non-­‐international	  armed	  conflicts);	  GARY	  SOLIS,	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  ARMED	  
CONFLICT:	  INTERNATIONAL	  HUMANITARIAN	  LAW	  IN	  WAR	  100-­‐01(2010)	  (“[W]ar	  crimes	  and	  grave	  
breaches	  can	  indeed	  be	  committed	  in	  non-­‐international	  common	  Article	  3	  armed	  conflicts.”).	  
80	  Nils	  Melzer,	  Foreword	  to	  Keeping	  the	  Balance	  Between	  Military	  Necessity	  and	  Humanity:	  A	  
Response	  to	  Four	  Critiques	  of	  the	  ICRC’s	  Interpretive	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Notion	  of	  Direct	  
Participation	  in	  Hostilities,	  42	  N.Y.U.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  &	  POL.	  831,	  833	  (2010)	  (discussing	  the	  difficulties	  
in	  contemporary	  armed	  conflicts	  due	  to	  the	  “blurring	  of	  the	  traditional	  distinctions	  and	  
categories	  upon	  which	  the	  normative	  edifice	  of	  IHL	  has	  been	  built.	  .	  .	  .”).	  
81	  See	  Nils	  Melzer,	  Foreword	  to	  Interpretive	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Notion	  of	  Direct	  Participation	  in	  
Hostilities	  Under	  International	  Humanitarian	  Law	  4,	  ICRC	  (May	  2009)	  [hereinafter	  ICRC	  
Interpretive	  Guidance],	  available	  at	  http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets	  /files/other/icrc-­‐002-­‐
0990.pdf	  (stating	  that	  “the	  protection	  of	  civilians	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  goals	  of	  international	  
humanitarian	  law.”).	  
82	  See	  generally	  McKenzie	  Jr.,	  supra	  note	  3.	  
83	  See	  infra	  Section	  II	  for	  discussion	  on	  the	  various	  approaches	  to	  warfare	  adopted	  by	  
contemporary	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups.	  
84	  McKenzie	  Jr.,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  88.	  
85	  Id.	  
86	  See	  AP	  I,	  supra	  note	  11,	  art.	  48.	  The	  distinction	  requirement	  also	  applies	  in	  non-­‐international	  
armed	  conflict.	  	  See	  AP	  II,	  supra	  note	  82,	  art.	  13	  (stating	  “[c]ivilians	  shall	  enjoy	  the	  protection	  
afforded	  by	  this	  part,	  unless	  and	  for	  such	  time	  as	  they	  take	  a	  direct	  part	  in	  hostilities”);	  See	  also	  
SOLIS,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  254	  (discussing	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  distinction	  in	  all	  
conflicts);	  Cf	  Kenneth	  Watkin,	  Opportunity	  Lost:	  Organized	  Armed	  Groups	  and	  the	  ICRC	  “Direct	  
Participation	  in	  Hostilities”	  Interpretive	  Guidance,	  42	  N.Y.U.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  &	  POL.	  641,	  646	  (2010)	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therefore	   an	   opportunity	   for	   the	   non-­‐state	   armed	   group	   versus	   an	   obligation	  
for	  the	  state	  actor.87	   	  Whereas	  the	  state	  actor	  must	  protect	  civilians,	  the	  non-­‐
state	  armed	  group	   simply	   views	   civilians	  as	  an	  asymmetric	  warfare	  asset	   that	  
may	   be	   leveraged	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   an	   advantage	   against	   their	   state	   actor	  
adversaries.88	  
	   Considering	  civilians	  as	  an	  “asset	  to	  be	  expended”89	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  
blatantly	   ignore	   the	   general	   protections	   afforded	   non-­‐combatants	   during	  
hostilities.90	   	  Yet	  this	  callous	  disregard	  for	   long-­‐standing	  humanitarian	  norms91	  
is	  sadly	  not	  unusual	  or	  surprising.	  	  Despite	  the	  international	  impetus	  to	  protect	  
civilians	  from	  the	  atrocities	  of	  war,92	  the	  state	  actor’s	  resultant	  legal	  obligations	  
perversely	   incentivises	   non-­‐state	   actors	   to	   misuse	   civilians.	   	   Contemporary	  
conflicts	   “waged	  between	   government	   forces	   and	  organized	  non-­‐state	   armed	  
groups”	  are	  routinely	  characterized	  by	  an	  “intermingling	  of	  civilians	  and	  armed	  
actors”	   and	   a	   stubborn	   unwillingness	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   to	   “adequately	  
distinguish	   themselves	   from	   the	   civilian	   population.”93	   	   As	   these	   conflicts	   are	  
now	  the	  predominant	   form	  of	  warfare94	   this	   intentional	  misuse	  of	  civilians	  by	  
non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	   is	  a	  harsh	  reality	  driving	  a	  number	  of	  responses	  from	  
state	  actors.	  	  	  
	   Though	  often	  perceived	  as	  “fighting	  with	  one	  arm	  tied	  behind	  [their]	  back”	  
and	  admittedly	  causing	  much	  frustration,	  state	  actors	  recognize	  the	  importance	  
of	  complying	  with	  the	  Law	  of	  War	  as	  “preserving	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  .	  .	  constitutes	  
an	   important	   component	   of	   [their]	   security	   stance.”95	   	   State	   actors	   thus	  
                                                                                                                             
(“[c]ompliance	  with	  the	  distinction	  principle	  is	  required	  of	  all	  participants	  in	  warfare	  regardless	  
of	  whether	  they	  fight	  for	  state	  armed	  forces	  or	  a	  non-­‐State	  ‘organized	  armed	  group.’”).	  
87	  See	  SOLIS,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  254	  (discussing	  the	  frequent	  disregard	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  
distinction	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors).	  
88	  See	  generally	  McKenzie	  Jr.,	  supra	  note3,	  at	  76.	  
89	  Id.	  at	  88.	  
90	  See,	  e.g.,	  Laura	  King,	  Afghanistan	  Arrests	  Preteen	  Would-­‐be	  Bombers	  Months	  After	  Pardon,	  
LOS	  ANGELES	  TIMES,	  (Feb.	  13,	  2012),	  http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-­‐fg-­‐
afghanistan-­‐child-­‐bombers-­‐20120214,0,7784954.story	  (last	  visited	  Feb.	  17,	  2012)	  (describing	  
how	  insurgents	  in	  Afghanistan	  are	  using	  young	  children	  as	  suicide	  bombers).	  
91	  See,	  COMMENTARY	  ON	  THE	  ADDITIONAL	  PROTOCOLS	  OF	  8	  JUNE	  1977	  TO	  THE	  GENEVA	  CONVENTIONS	  OF	  12	  
AUG.	  1949,	  598	  (Yves	  Sandoz,	  et.	  al.	  eds.,	  1987)	  [hereinafter	  Commentaries]	  (“It	  is	  the	  
foundation	  on	  which	  the	  codification	  of	  the	  laws	  and	  customs	  of	  war	  rests:	  the	  civilian	  
population	  and	  civilian	  objects	  must	  be	  respected	  and	  protected	  .	  .	  .	  .	  The	  entire	  system	  
established	  in	  The	  Hague	  in	  1899	  and	  1907	  and	  in	  Geneva	  from	  1864	  to	  1977	  is	  founded	  on	  
this	  rule.”).	  
92	  See	  Id.	  (discussing	  the	  historical	  reason	  for	  protecting	  civilians	  and	  the	  particular	  need	  for	  a	  
codification	  of	  this	  customary	  understanding	  following	  the	  brutality	  of	  World	  War	  II).	  	  
93	  ICRC	  Interpretive	  Guidance,	  supra	  note	  84,	  at	  4–5.	  
94	  See	  Watkin,	  supra	  note	  89,	  at	  653.	  	  
95	  Id.	  at	  647	  (citing	  HCJ	  769/02	  Pub.	  Comm.	  Against	  Torture	  in	  Israel	  v.	  Gov’t	  of	  Israel	  64	  [2005]	  
(Isr.),	  available	  at	  http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf	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“operate	   under	   constraints	   when	   conducting	   operations,”	   and	   in	   particular	  
strive	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   distinction	   principle	   in	   these	   complex	   and	   messy	  
conflicts.96	  	  Using	  a	  combination	  of	  policy	  mandates	  and	  advanced	  technology,	  
state	   actors	   continually	   try	   to	   disentangle	   non-­‐state	   actors	   from	   local	  
populations.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   United	   States	   military,	   desperate	   to	   reduce	  
civilian	  casualties	  in	  the	  often	  confusing	  environments	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,	  
has	  universally	   implemented	  the	  Escalation	  of	  Force	  (EOF)	  process.97	   	  The	  EOF	  
process	  trains	  American	  soldiers	  to	  work	  through	  a	  number	  of	  sequential	  steps	  
in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  between	  a	  harmless	  civilian	  and	  an	  actual	  threat	  in	  hopes	  
of	   gaining	   clarity	   before	   using	   deadly	   force.98	   	   Similarly,	   The	   North	   Atlantic	  
Treaty	  Organization’s	  (NATO)	  6	  July	  2009	  Tactical	  Directive	  imposed	  restrictions	  
on	   a	   number	   of	   weapon	   systems	   and	   tactics	   in	   hopes	   of	   reducing	   civilian	  
casualties	  in	  Afghanistan.99	  
	   State	  actors	  also	  rely	  heavily	  on	  technology	  to	  help	  determine	  who	  can	  be	  
targeted.100	   	   The	   United	   States	   uses	   a	   scientific,	   heavily	   computerized,	  
deliberate	  targeting	  process	  known	  as	  the	  Collateral	  Damage	  Estimation,101	   to	  
ensure	   strict	   compliance	   with	   both	   the	   distinction	   and	   proportionality	  
principles.102	  	  Non-­‐lethal	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicles	  (UAV)	  are	  a	  common	  tool	  of	  
government	  forces	  to	  help	  pierce	  the	  “fog	  of	  war”	  and	  decipher	  the	  intentions	  
of	   individual	  actors	   in	  a	  conflict	  zone.103	   	  Precision-­‐guided	  munitions	  allow	  for	  
                                                                                                                             
(discussing	  pragmatic	  security	  reasons	  that	  a	  state	  will	  self-­‐restrain	  their	  combat	  activities).	  
96	  Id.	  at	  64–67.	  
97	  See	  generally	  Randall	  Bagwell,	  The	  Threat	  Assessment	  Process	  (TAP):	  The	  Evolution	  of	  
Escalation	  of	  Force,	  ARMY	  LAW.,	  Apr.	  2008,	  at	  5.	  
98	  Id.	  at	  8	  (“The	  goal	  .	  .	  .	  is	  to	  force	  the	  insurgent	  to	  self-­‐identify	  while	  keeping	  innocent	  civilians	  
from	  being	  mistaken	  for	  threats.	  This	  approach	  works	  primarily	  because	  it	  uses	  non-­‐force	  
measures	  to	  put	  potential	  threats	  into	  situations	  where	  they	  must	  either	  comply	  with	  or	  
disobey	  the	  Soldiers’	  commands.”).	  
99	  See	  Headquarters,	  Int’l	  Sec.	  Assistance	  Force,	  Tactical	  Dir.	  (July	  6,	  2009)	  [hereinafter	  Tactical	  
Directive],	  available	  at	  http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_	  
090706.pdf.	  	  
100	  Watkin,	  supra	  note	  89,	  at	  646	  (“At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  question	  of	  who	  can	  be	  targeted	  is	  the	  
principle	  of	  distinction.”).	  
101	  See	  generally	  Gregory	  S.	  McNeal,	  The	  U.S.	  Practice	  of	  Collateral	  Damage	  Estimation	  and	  
Mitigation	  (Nov.	  9,	  2011)	  (Unpublished	  Working	  Paper)	  (discussing	  the	  technical	  methodology	  
employed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  for	  pre-­‐planned	  targeting	  and	  its	  overarching	  goal	  of	  minimizing	  
civilian	  casualties)	  available	  at	  	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583.	  
102	  The	  Principle	  of	  Proportionality	  determines	  whether	  “an	  attack	  .	  .	  .	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  
cause	  incidental	  loss	  of	  civilian	  life,	  injury	  to	  civilians,	  damage	  to	  civilian	  objects,	  or	  a	  
combination	  thereof	  [that	  will]	  be	  excessive	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  concrete	  and	  direct	  military	  
advantage	  anticipated.”	  AP	  I,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  art.	  51(5)(b).	  
103	  See	  Martin	  E.	  Dempsey,	  Forward	  to	  U.S.	  Army	  UAS	  Ctr.	  Of	  Excellence,	  “Eyes	  of	  the	  Army”	  
U.S.	  Army	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  Roadmap	  2010-­‐2035,	  U.S.	  ARMY,	  i	  (2010),	  http://www-­‐
rucker.army.mil/usaace/uas/	  US%20Army%20UAS%C20RoadMap%202010%202035.pdf	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extraordinarily	   accurate	   and	   discriminate	   targeting104	   while	   electronic	  
intelligence	   gathering	   pinpoints	   clandestine	   non-­‐state	   actors.	   	   Yet,	   despite	  
these	   policy	   restrictions	   and	   technological	   advances,	   complying	   with	   the	  
principle	   of	   distinction	   remains	   extraordinarily	   difficult	   for	   state	   actors105	   as	  
“the	  principle	  .	  .	  .	  is	  easy	  to	  state”	  but	  challenging	  to	  implement.106	  
	   Implementation	   challenges	   are	   largely	   a	   result	   of	   the	   realities	   of	  
contemporary	   conflicts.	   	   As	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   intentionally	   mix	   with	  
civilians,	   the	   task	   of	   discerning	   an	   individual’s	   status	   and	   their	   accompanying	  
level	   of	   humanitarian	   protection107	   often	   falls	   to	   junior	   leaders	   and	   their	  
soldiers.108	  	  Further,	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  are	  not	  passively	  using	  the	  civilian	  
population	   as	   a	   shield	   from	   attack,	   but,	   in	   furtherance	   of	   their	   asymmetric	  
strategy,	  will	  often	  attempt	  to	  draw	  a	  disproportionate	  response	  from	  the	  state	  
actor	  in	  order	  to	  further	  a	  propaganda	  message.109	  	  Practical	  implementation	  of	  
the	   principle	   of	   distinction	   in	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   operations	   therefore	   becomes	   the	  
responsibility	   of	   the	   “soldiers	   and	   other	   fighters.”110	   	   The	   enormity	   of	   this	  
responsibility	   coupled	   with	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   modern	   battlefield	  
understandably	   leads	   to	   “confusion	   and	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   the	   distinction	  
between	   legitimate	   military	   targets	   and	   persons	   protected	   against	   direct	  
                                                                                                                             
(stating	  that	  unmanned	  aerial	  vehicles	  help	  to	  “broaden	  situational	  awareness”	  as	  well	  as	  
improve	  the	  ability	  to	  “see,	  target,	  and	  destroy	  the	  enemy”	  in	  uncertain	  and	  complex	  
environments).	  
104	  See,	  e.g.,	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  Anwar	  al-­‐Awlaki	  killed	  in	  Yemen,	  CBS	  NEWS	  (Sept.	  30,	  2011,	  5:02	  AM),	  
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/30/501364/main20113732.shtml.	  
105	  See	  Melzer,	  supra	  note	  83,	  at	  833	  (noting	  that	  the	  increased	  civilian	  involvement	  in	  modern	  
warfare	  has	  led	  distinction	  problems	  between	  legitimate	  military	  targets	  and	  persons	  
protected	  against	  direct	  attack.”).	  
106	  Watkin,	  supra	  note	  89,	  at	  646.	  
107	  See	  SOLIS,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  187	  (“On	  the	  battlefield,	  no	  one	  is	  without	  some	  status	  and	  an	  
accompanying	  level	  of	  humanitarian	  protection.”).	  
108	  See	  Charles	  C.	  Krulak,	  The	  Strategic	  Corporal:	  Leadership	  in	  the	  Three	  Block	  War,	  MARINES	  
MAG.	  Jan.	  1999,	  at	  26,	  30	  (1999),	  available	  at	  
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm	  	  (stating	  the	  strategic	  
corporal	  concept	  is	  a	  recognition	  that	  modern	  conflicts	  will	  see	  “the	  lines	  separating	  the	  levels	  
of	  war,	  and	  distinguishing	  combatant	  from	  ‘non-­‐combatant,’”	  blur	  and	  “and	  adversaries,	  
confounded	  by	  .	  .	  .	  [the	  state’s]	  ‘conventional’	  superiority,	  will	  resort	  to	  asymmetrical	  means	  to	  
redress	  the	  imbalance.”	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  modern	  battlefield	  will	  “rest,	  
increasingly,	  with	  the	  rifleman	  and	  with	  his	  ability	  to	  make	  the	  right	  decision	  at	  the	  right	  time	  
at	  the	  point	  of	  contact.”).	  
109	  See	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  ARMY,	  FM	  3-­‐24,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  ¶	  	  1–152	  (stating	  that	  non-­‐state	  armed	  
groups	  will	  “carry	  out	  a	  terrorist	  act	  or	  guerrilla	  raid”	  	  with	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  enticing	  the	  
opposing	  actor	  “to	  overreact”	  in	  a	  way	  that	  can	  be	  exploited	  “—for	  example,	  opening	  fire	  on	  a	  
crowd	  .	  .	  .	  .”	  );	  McKenzie	  Jr.,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  77	  (discussing	  how	  “asymmetric	  approaches	  can	  
achieve	  powerful	  effect	  through	  manipulation	  of	  the	  psychological	  element.”).	  
110	  Watkin,	  supra	  note	  89,	  at	  646.	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attack.”111	  
	   This	   “confusion	   and	   uncertainty”	   is	   a	   hallmark	   of	   the	   state	   actor	   conflict	  
with	   the	  non-­‐state	  armed	  group	  and	  creates	  significant	  humanitarian	  risks	   for	  
civilian	   populations.112	   	   It	   is	   therefore	   particularly	   alarming	   that	   non-­‐state	  
armed	   groups	   are	   further	   complicating	   these	   conflicts	   by	   using	   advanced	  
technology,	  and	  specifically	  information	  technology,	  to	  expand	  their	  operations	  
across	   the	   entirety	   of	   the	   international	   community.	   	   Widely	   dispersed,	   yet	  
capable	   of	   operating	   and	   collaborating	   through	   cyberspace,	   non-­‐state	   armed	  
groups	  are	  extensively	   transnational.113	   	   Further,	   the	   cyber	  domain	  allows	   for	  
more	  discrete	  forms	  of	  terror	  activities	  with	  the	  contemporary	  non-­‐state	  actor	  
more	   likely	   to	   be	   a	   financier,	   strategic	   planner,	   or	   propagandist	   than	   a	  
“traditional	   terrorist”	  operator.114	   	  A	  non-­‐exhaustive	   list	  of	  examples	   includes:	  
Anwar	   al-­‐Awlaki,	   from	   a	   remote	   location	   in	   Yemen,	   encouraging	   and	  
coordinating	   various	   terror	   operations,	   particularly	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   by	  
using	   “Youtube,	   broader	   Internet	   sites,	   Facebook,	   [and]	   Twitter;”115	   al-­‐Qaeda	  
computer	   operatives	   widely	   publishing	   versions	   of	   bomb-­‐making	   manuals,	  
often	   in	  English,	  on	  the	   Internet	  to	  encourage	  remote	  training;116	  groups	  such	  
                                                
111	  Melzer,	  supra	  note	  83,	  at	  833.	  
112	  See,	  e.g.,	  Goldstone	  Report,	  supra	  note	  12	  (alleging	  a	  number	  of	  Law	  of	  War	  violations	  that	  
involved	  civilians	  committed	  by	  both	  Israeli	  forces	  and	  Hamas	  during	  the	  conflict	  in	  Gaza	  from	  
27	  December	  2008	  to	  18	  January	  2009);	  but	  see	  State	  of	  Israel,	  Gaza	  Operations	  Investigations:	  
An	  Update	  32	  (Jan.	  2010),	  http://www.mfa.	  gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8E841A98-­‐1755-­‐413DA1D2-­‐
8B30F64022BE/0/GazaOperationInvestigationsUpdate.pdf	  	  (refuting	  the	  Goldstone	  Reports	  
findings);	  See	  also	  Kevin	  Sieff,	  Afghan	  Civilian	  Deaths	  Hit	  Record	  High	  in	  2011,	  U.N.	  Report	  
Says,”	  WASH.	  POST,	  Feb.	  4,	  2012	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-­‐civilian-­‐
deaths-­‐hit-­‐record-­‐high-­‐in-­‐2011-­‐un-­‐report-­‐says/2012	  /02/04/gIQAfyl9oQ_story.html	  (noting	  
that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  civilian	  deaths	  came	  from	  Taliban	  roadside	  or	  suicide	  bombings).	  
113	  See	  RUSSELL	  D.	  HOWARD	  &	  REID	  L.	  SAWYER,	  TERRORISM	  AND	  COUNTERTERRORISM	  –UNDERSTANDING	  THE	  
NEW	  SECURITY	  ENVIRONMENT	  77	  (2004)	  (noting	  that	  al-­‐Qaeda	  is	  a	  global	  network	  consisting	  of	  
permanent	  or	  independently	  operating	  semi-­‐permanent	  cells	  of	  trained	  militants	  that	  have	  a	  
presence	  in	  more	  than	  seventy-­‐six	  countries).	  
114	  See,	  e.g.,	  Brian	  Ross,	  How	  Anwar	  al-­‐Awlaki	  Inspired	  Terror	  From	  Across	  the	  Globe,	  ABC	  NEWS	  
THE	  BLOTTER	  	  http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/anwar-­‐al-­‐awlaki-­‐inspired-­‐
terror/story?id=14643383	  (describing	  al-­‐Awlaki	  as	  the	  “modern	  day	  terrorist”	  capable	  of	  using	  
the	  internet	  to	  conduct	  terrorist	  activity).	  
115	  Id.	  (“While	  al-­‐Awlaki	  was	  not	  the	  trigger-­‐man	  in	  any	  of	  the	  19	  terror	  operations	  to	  which	  he	  
is	  linked,	  U.S.	  officials	  and	  terror	  experts	  said	  that	  his	  hand	  was	  visible	  in	  all	  of	  them—whether	  
by	  simply	  pushing	  the	  attackers	  over	  the	  violent	  edge	  or	  by	  personally	  guiding	  them	  through	  
operations.”).	  
116	  See	  Duncan	  Gardham,	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  Bomb	  Manual	  Published	  on	  Internet,	  THE	  TELEGRAPH,	  (Feb.	  
22,	  2012,	  7:00	  AM),	  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-­‐in-­‐the-­‐
uk/8232389/Al-­‐Qaeda-­‐bomb-­‐manual-­‐published-­‐on-­‐internet.html	  (“Published	  by	  al-­‐Qaeda’s	  
Global	  Islamic	  Media	  Front”	  in	  order	  allow	  followers	  “to	  launch	  their	  own	  attacks,	  without	  
training.”).	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asal-­‐Qaeda,	  Hamas,	  Lashkare-­‐Taiba,	  and	  Hezbollah,	  “mak[ing]	  extensive	  use	  of	  
the	   Internet	   to	   raise	  and	   transfer	  needed	   funds	   to	   support	   their	  activities”	  as	  
the	  Internet	  “offers	  a	  broad	  reach,	  timely	  efficiency,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  certain	  degree	  
of	  anonymity	  and	  security	   for	  both	  donors	  and	   recipients.”117	   	  These	   types	  of	  
activities	   make	   the	   non-­‐state	   actor	   not	   only	   exceedingly	   difficult	   to	   identify,	  
these	   actions	   also	   make	   the	   global	   population,	   even	   if	   ignorant	   about	   the	  
hostilities,	   potentially	   a	   de	   facto	   human	   shield.	   	   This	   trend	   towards	  
decentralized,	   discrete	  non-­‐state	   actor	   terrorist	   activity	   thus	   further	  blurs	   the	  
lines	  drawn	  within	  the	  principle	  of	  distinction	  between	  conflict	  participant	  and	  
civilian	   while	   dramatically	   increasing	   the	   civilian	   population’s	   exposure	   to	  
hostilities.	  	  
	   State	   actors	   are	   simply	   not	   prepared	   for	   this	   trend.	   Previous	   responses,	  
whether	   policy	   mandates	   or	   sophisticated	   technology,	   relied	   upon	   to	   clarify	  
individual	   status	   on	   the	   modern	   battlefield	   are	   of	   minimal	   use	   in	   these	  
transnational	   conflicts.	   	   Rules	   of	   engagement,	   tactical	   directives,	   and	   soldier	  
training	  are	  almost	  exclusively	  oriented	  on	  non-­‐international	  conflicts	  within	  a	  
specific	   geographic	   area.118	   	   Sophisticated	   technology	   is	   limited	   by	   resources	  
and	  intelligence	  and	  thus	  difficult	  to	  employ	  without	  some	  parameters.	  	  These	  
shortcomings	  ensure	  that	  non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  will	  continue	  to	  counter	  the	  
technological	  superiority	  of	  state	  actors	  by	  exploiting	  the	  distinction	  principle.	  
This	   leaves	   state	   actors	   and	   the	   international	   community	   again	   left	   with	   the	  
seemingly	  impossible	  task	  of	  determining	  “how	  .	  .	   .	  the	  principle	  of	  distinction	  
should	   be	   implemented	   in	   the	   challenging	   and	   complex	   circumstances	   of	  
contemporary	   warfare.”119	   	   This	   has	   become	   a	   contentious,	   and	   difficult	   to	  
answer	   question.120	   	   But	   without	   an	   answer,	   the	  walls	   separating	   combatant	  
and	   civilian	   will	   continue	   to	   crumble,	   creating	   the	   very	   real,	   and	   dangerous,	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IV.	  CONCLUSION	  
	  
	   The	   relationship	   between	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups	   and	   advanced	  
technology	   creates	   a	   number	   of	   uncertain	   and	   frightening	   humanitarian	  
challenges	   for	   the	   international	   community.	   	   The	   “widespread	   availability	   of	  
sophisticated	  weapons	  and	  equipment	   .	   .	   .	   ‘level	   the	  playing	   field’	  and	  negate	  
[state	   actor’s]	   traditional	   technological	   superiority”122	   while	   exponentially	  
increasing	  the	  lethality	  of	  the	  non-­‐state	  armed	  group.	   	  Unrestrained	  by	  law	  or	  
morality,	   non-­‐state	   armed	   groups’	   growing	   familiarity	   with	   unmanned	   aerial	  
vehicles,	   weapons	   of	   mass	   destruction,	   surface-­‐to-­‐air	   missiles,	   information	  
technology,	   and	   improvised	   explosive	   devices	   is	   extraordinarily	   dangerous.	  
Similarly,	  while	  mitigating	  state	  actor	  technological	  superiority	  by	  commingling	  
with	  civilians	   is	  not	  a	  new	  tactic,123	  advanced	  technology	   is	  allowing	  non-­‐state	  
armed	   groups	   to	   expand	   this	   tactic	   across	   the	   globe	   at	   an	   unprecedented	  
rate.124	  	  Capable	  of	  supporting	  operations	  with	  seemingly	  benign	  activity,	  these	  
widely	  dispersed	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  difficult	   to	   identify	  and	  place	  previously	  
safe	   civilian	   populations	   at	   risk.	   	   Additionally,	   this	   increased	   ability	   to	   use	  
advanced	  technology	  to	  aggressively	  exploit	  the	  state	  obligation	  to	  distinguish	  
between	   civilians	   and	   conflict	   participants	   de-­‐legitimizes	   and	   undercuts	   this	  
fundamental	  principle	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  War.	  	  	  
	   The	   necessity	   for	   the	   international	   community	   to	   recognize	   and	   address	  
these	   ominous	   threats	   is	   clear.	   	   The	   humanitarian	   consequences	   of	   inaction	  
place	   untold	   civilians	   at	   risk	   while	   raising	   troubling	   questions	   concerning	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  War	  to	  regulate	  contemporary	  conflicts.	   	  Facing	  “a	  
complex	   and	   uncertain	   security	   landscape	   in	   which	   the	   pace	   of	   change	  
continues	   to	   accelerate,”125	   the	   international	   community	   must	   adapt	   to	   this	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